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1. Introduction 
 Over the next decade, the investment industry will be heavily shaped by two 
major tides: the swell of “baby boomers” approaching retirement and the continuing rapid 
ebb of defined benefit pensions.  Baby boomers will need to rely more heavily on defined 
contribution pensions (such as 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts) than 
did previous generations of retirees.  Professionals in private wealth management, 
financial planning, the mutual fund industry, and the insurance industry are already 
increasing their efforts to solve the problem of how best to generate retirement income 
from a stock of accumulated pension wealth.  How retirees choose among these 
alternative solutions will determine who are the winners and losers from these large asset 
flows. 
A significant part of the discussion in the industry focuses on whether retirees are 
adequately protected against longevity risk, because baby boomers are less likely to have 
the high degree of guaranteed lifetime income that was formerly provided by defined 
benefit pensions.  A natural replacement for a defined benefit pension is a lifetime 
income annuity purchased from retirement savings.  Decades of economic analysis 
starting with Yaari [1965] have pointed to annuities as a major component of optimal 
retirement consumption plans.  Yaari  showed that a retiree with no desire to leave a 
bequest should annuitize all retirement savings.   However, the insurance industry has 
long faced the dilemma that most retirees do not convert any retirement assets into 
annuities.  Studies after Yaari’s work have demonstrated that several factors diminish the 
benefits from full annuitization.  However, a significant “annuity puzzle” remains in the 
fact that there is virtually zero voluntary annuitization beyond the payouts provided by 
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Social Security and defined benefit pensions.  It would be a miraculous coincidence if the 
optimal partial annuitization strategy equaled the amounts provided by Social Security 
and defined benefit pensions for the vast majority of retirees.  It would be even harder to 
believe that the shrinking of defined benefit pensions over time should not increase the 
need for privately purchased annuities. 
 Some authors have speculated that behavioral factors may prevent most retirees 
from converting accumulated savings into an annuity income stream.  This paper seeks to 
put that speculation to the test through a systematic analysis of the annuity decision in the 
light of behavioral finance.  The investment industry’s success at helping managing 
retirees’ longevity risk will depend heavily on understanding these powerful behavioral 
influences on retirees’ evaluations of annuity products.  We seek to answer the questions: 
Can behavioral finance explain why purchasing annuities with retirement assets is 
undesirable?  What psychological errors documented in the experimental literature are 
responsible for the largest distortions in the annuity decision?   
 Previous annuity research has been almost completely focused on immediate 
payout annuities.  However, the insurance industry has continued to create innovative 
annuity products, one of which is the delayed payout annuity or “longevity annuity,” a 
contract purchased today that begins payments only if the individual reaches an advanced 
age.  Scott, Watson, and Hu [2006] demonstrate that these annuities can be markedly 
superior to immediate payout annuities for retirees willing to annuitize only a fraction of 
their savings.  While that analysis has a strong normative implication that longevity 
annuities should be highly desirable to an expected utility maximizer, a significant 
question remains whether this new form of annuity will actually realize significant 
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demand or whether it will extend the annuity puzzle even further.  Our behavioral 
analysis will show that longevity annuities can be more attractive than immediate 
annuities to a retiree operating under behavioral biases. 
 
2. Annuities under Expected Utility Models 
 Yaari [1965] showed that retirees should annuitize all of their wealth, assuming 
actuarially fair annuity prices and the absence of bequest motives.  In the ensuing 
decades, several authors have argued that partial annuitization may be preferred, due to 
factors such as the illiquidity of annuities, bequest motives, or the ability to earn higher 
rates of return through stock investments (see the excellent overview in Brown and 
Warshawsky [2004]).  Other authors have noted that annuities may be substituted by 
intrafamily mortality risk sharing (i.e., a husband and wife can implicitly insure each 
other by forming their own “mortality pool” of two persons).  While all of these factors 
may diminish the gains from annuitization, they do not satisfactorily model the empirical 
fact that the vast majority of retirees’ longevity-insured income streams is provided by 
Social Security and defined benefit pensions, in amounts that are not optimally chosen by 
each retiree.  For those retirees with little or no retirement savings, this represents 
effectively full annuitization.  However, for retirees with substantial savings, we observe 
very little additional annuitization.  It would be a very peculiar coincidence if this pattern 
were optimal, since the extreme heterogeneity in private savings levels would imply very 
different annuitization fractions (determined almost completely by non-voluntary 
annuities). 
 Departing from traditional models with additively separable utility, Davidoff, 
Brown, and Diamond [2005] use a habit-formation model of utility to “stress-test” the 
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notion that low annuitization rates might be explained by the possibility that income 
streams provided by annuities differ markedly from desired consumption paths.  Their 
simulations show that it is “extremely difficult” to find situations where less than two-
thirds of retirement wealth should be invested in annuities.  Given their lack of success in 
explaining low annuitization from a rational perspective, they state that “lack of annuity 
demand may arise from behavioral considerations.” 
 
3. A Behavioral Analysis of Annuities 
 The existing annuity literature is almost entirely normative, seeking to explain 
how a rational individual should behave.  The last couple of decades have seen a 
blossoming of alternative descriptive models that better explain how individuals actually 
make choices, particularly choices involving risky outcomes.  Some of these papers such 
as Kahneman and Tversky [1979] and Tversky and Kahneman [1992] present both 
formal models as well as experimental evidence to measure the value of model 
parameters.  Other authors have used such models (or some components of these models) 
to explain economic anomalies that are poorly explained by expected utility models.  For 
example, Benartzi and Thaler [1995] and Barberis, Huang and Santos [2001] apply 
Tversky and Kahneman’s [1992] cumulative prospect theory to explain the equity 
premium puzzle.   
We first define the relevant mental account that is likely to be used for the annuity 
decision.  We then apply cumulative prospect theory (CPT) as a baseline model for 
analyzing the annuity “gamble.”  In the Appendix, we discuss other behavioral 
considerations that are less easily quantified but may still be major sources of distortion 
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in the annuity decision: the availability heuristic, fear of illiquidity, hyperbolic 
discounting, and the distinction between risk and uncertainty.  
 
Mental Accounting 
 A cornerstone of behavioral finance is that risky outcomes are not always 
evaluated in terms of potential outcomes for ending total wealth, but often as outcomes 
more narrowly defined within their own mental accounts (see Thaler [1999]).  For 
example, a person considering a gamble which puts $10 at risk should, according to 
expected utility theory, evaluate the overall impact on total wealth; however, behavioral 
research points to a pattern in which individuals are more likely to evaluate the $10 
gamble in isolation.  In the case of the annuity decision, a similar question arises whether 
the retiree recognizes the impact of annuitization on the retirement spending stream he 
can afford.  For example, a retiree without annuities may follow a rule of thumb where 
initial spending is set equal to say four percent of wealth, and then adjusted over time to 
keep up with inflation.  However, having an annuity stream should allow a retiree to 
spend more in retirement, because the annuity’s longevity insurance reduces the need for 
precautionary saving against long life.  There may be a “broad frame” in which the retiree 
values the fact that the annuity guarantees income even when he has lived well beyond 
life expectancy and may have exhausted most of his assets, and at the other extreme a 
“narrow frame” in which the annuity is evaluated purely as a gamble in itself.  Read, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin [1999] argue that framing of decisions is more likely to be 
narrow when cognitive limitations on analytical processing power come into play.  For 
the purposes of annuity evaluation, the complexity of intertemporal consumption 
planning argues strongly that most retirees will adopt a narrow frame.  The optimization 
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of intertemporal consumption is a very complicated task in itself (which is why many 
retirees adopt rules of thumb such as “don’t spend from principal”), and the addition of 
annuities makes it even more daunting.1  It is more plausible that a retiree evaluates an 
annuity from the perspective “will I live long enough to make back my initial investment 
in this annuity?”  Brown and Warshawsky [2004] describe consumers’ attitudes in 
research by an American Council of Life Insurance task force with the statement “some 
consumer focus group participants equated lifetime annuity payments with gambling on 
their lives” [emphasis added], which means that annuities are perceived as increasing 
overall risk in retirement.  Similarly, a Society of Actuaries [2004] survey found that 
nearly half of workers and retirees in defined contribution plans described “protecting 
against the loss of value from a pension or annuity investment should they die earlier than 
expected” as very important.  These perspectives can best be understood in terms of the 
mental accounting framework: an annuity is segregated into its own mental account 
rather than integrated with all retirement consumption dollars.2   
 Within this mental accounting framework, gains on the annuity “gamble” occur if 
the total discounted value of payouts exceeds the initial investment (i.e., the retiree lives 
longer than expected), whereas losses occur if payouts are less than the initial investment 
(the retiree dies “early”).  Behavioral researchers have not reached a consensus on how 
intertemporal gambles are treated, and in particular on the question of what discount rates 
are applicable.  As a starting point, we make the assumption (to be relaxed later) that 
                                                 
1 In addition, most financial planning tools also do not solve an intertemporal utility maximization problem. 
2 While mental accounting may prevent retirees from perceiving the value of longevity insurance, it may 
also lead retirees to ignore some negative features such as the illiquidity of annuities, which may dampen 
annuity desirability when future spending is uncertain. 
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individuals correctly compute the net present value of future outcomes.3  Thus, we define 
the outcome of an annuity investment in which the retiree invests $A in an immediate 
annuity and dies in year s as: 
∑
=
−++−≡
s
t
ts )r(
YAx
1
11
1  
where Y represents the annual annuity payout.4  In this analysis, we assume that annuity 
prices are actuarially fair, based on Social Security mortality tables with no fees and a 
constant interest rate of 3 percent.  These assumptions imply that the expected 
(probability-weighted) present value of the annuity gamble is zero, so a risk-neutral 
investor operating within the mental accounting perspective would be indifferent to 
purchasing the annuity.  (A risk-averse investor would be willing to purchase the annuity 
only if the price were more favorable than actuarially fair.) 
 Now that the annuity outcomes have been defined according to mental accounting 
principles, we next describe how behavioral investors evaluate those outcomes, using 
Tversky and Kahneman’s [1992] seminal work on cumulative prospect theory. 
 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 
 CPT has three main components that we introduce in turn: a reference point, a 
value function, and decision weights.  CPT assumes that risky outcomes are evaluated in 
terms of potential gains or losses relative to a reference point.  The reference point is 
usually assumed to be the current wealth position.  In the case of the annuitization 
decision, it is natural to define the reference point as the status quo of non-annuitization.  
                                                 
3 Ultimately, we hope that the behavioral literature will develop (and empirically calibrate) more complete 
models of intertemporal choice that can be applied to the annuity decision.   
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 CPT furthermore posits that gains and losses are valued through a nonlinear value 
function given by 
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Tversky and Kahneman [1992] estimate λ=2.25, α=β=0.88.  This function is concave for 
gains and convex for losses, thus yielding a property often called “diminishing 
sensitivity.”  The convexity in losses can give rise to risk-seeking behavior, which is at 
odds with expected utility maximization with a concave utility function.  The λ 
coefficient measures the degree of loss aversion: a $1 loss is approximately twice as bad 
as a $1 gain is good, which predicts that fair gambles with equal chances of gains or 
losses will be disliked. 
 While expected utility theory assumes that utilities of different states are weighted 
by their probabilities, CPT argues that decision weights may be unequal to probabilities.  
In particular, low-probability events may be overweighted while larger probabilities may 
be underweighted.  Another feature of this framework is rank-dependence: more extreme 
gains or losses are weighted more heavily than intermediate gains or losses, even if the 
probabilities are equal.  Let w be a nonlinear transformation of the outcome probabilities 
(p), and this function may differ for gains and losses: 
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4 We adopt the convention that t=1 indicates the first (current) time period, during which the person is 
certain to be alive and receive payouts from any immediate annuities that have been purchased.  Thus, 
future payouts are discounted starting with t=2. 
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Tversky and Kahneman [1992] estimated γ=0.61 and δ=0.69.  These functions obey the 
conditions w(0)=0 and w(1)=1.  Figure 1 demonstrates the shape of the w+ function (the 
w- function is very similar): probabilities below about 0.4 are overweighted relative to 
their true probabilities, while larger probabilities are underweighted.  The ultimate 
decision weight πi attached to an outcome xi is captured by the change in the function w 
evaluated at the cumulative probability of that outcome xi.  Formally, this is represented 
for discrete outcomes by 
)p(w
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where the outcomes have been ranked according to  
x1 <  x2 < … < xk < 0 ≤  xk+1 <… < xT. 
One counter-intuitive feature of these decision weights is that they need not add up to 
one, because separate w functions for gains and losses are allowed. 
 The value function and decision weights are combined in an intuitive way to 
arrive at the total value of the annuity under consideration: 
∑
=
=
T
t
tt )x(v)annuity(V
1
π  
We note here that the particular parameter values provided by Tversky and Kahneman 
[1992] were based on experiments involving gambles that were quite different from the 
annuities we are analyzing.  We therefore caution that our analysis should be interpreted 
qualitatively, rather than as a precise quantitative prediction of individuals’ willlingness 
to pay for different types of annuities. 
 
4. Results 
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 Before we review the behavioral valuation of annuities as described in the 
previous section, we define a benchmark measure that describes valuation under the 
standard expected utility model and can also be extended to the CPT case.  We calculate 
the annuity price that would make an individual indifferent to buying an annuity.  This 
reservation price may differ from the actual annuity price.  If the reservation price is 
lower than the actual price, then the annuity is unattractive: the individual requires a 
discount in order to be willing to buy the annuity.  Conversely, if the reservation price is 
higher than the actual price, then the annuity is attractive.  In order to demonstrate the 
desirability of annuitization under expected utility, we analyze a hypothetical situation 
where a retiree without a bequest motive has chosen an optimal consumption stream that 
is provided by a series of zero-coupon bonds each costing {B1, B2,…, BT}.5  If the term 
structure of interest rates were flat, each Bt would equal 1/(1+r)t-1.  Suppose he considers 
switching a dollar of consumption in every period from bonds to an annuity, with the 
annuity price given by A.  Assuming actuarially fair annuity prices, the move from bonds 
to annuities will be able to provide the same level of consumption at a lower cost, 
because annuity prices have built-in mortality “discounts” reflecting the probability of 
being alive to receive the future payments.  We can calculate the reservation price R 
(defined as a fraction of the actual annuity price) that would make the retiree indifferent 
between bonds and annuities by setting  
RAB...B T ×=++1  
The left-hand side of this equation is the saved wealth from reducing the bond-
funded spending, and the right-hand side represents the equivalent cost of a hypothetical 
                                                 
5 For ease of exposition, we ignore the availability of equity investments and equity-linked variable 
annuities. 
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annuity (with a cost premium) that provides the same amount of spending power.  We 
then have ∑
=
=
T
t
t A/BR
1
.6  We can calculate similar measures for reservation prices under 
the CPT framework (although there is no simple formula owing to the way that gains or 
losses are accounted for).  Because we analyze annuities with different costs, the 
reservation price that we report is always normalized by the actuarially fair annuity cost: 
values above one imply that an actuarially fairly priced annuity is desirable, whereas 
values below one imply that the annuity is undesirable.7 
Table 1 reports the reservation prices for a hypothetical 65-year old male 
considering investing in an annuity.  In order to understand which behavioral influences 
account for the largest distortions in the annuity decision, we calculate reservation prices 
under the expected utility model and also under CPT with various specific features added 
piecemeal.  The rows represent these different models, while the columns represent 
different annuity types, from immediate annuities to longevity annuities with payouts 
beginning between 10 and 30 years in the future (but all purchased at age 65).   
 We note first that the reservation prices under expected utility are substantially 
greater than one and increase the further out the payments are received, reflecting the fact 
that annuity prices are more heavily discounted relative to bonds at later ages (with lower 
chances of survival).  In all of the behavioral models, the reservation price is much lower 
                                                 
6 We have assumed that there is no bequest motive, so the individual cares only about spending when he is 
alive and not about money left to heirs.  The presence of a bequest motive would reduce the reservation 
price, because trading in a bond portfolio for an equivalent annuity would reduce money left to heirs.  In 
the very extreme case of an individual who cares equally about his own spending when alive as about his 
heirs’ spending from the inheritance when he is dead, an immediate annuity would provide lower utility 
than a bond portfolio, because the bond portfolio is already able to provide a stable stream of income 
whether alive or dead. 
7 The inferences from analyzing reservation prices are qualitatively similar to findings based on 
calculations of certainty equivalents, another commonly used method of measuring the value of gambles.  
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than under expected utility.  The gain-loss mental accounting perspective is thus likely 
the single most important behavioral explanation for the unattractiveness of annuities.  
When analyzing the behavioral models’ reservation prices, we see from row A that a 
linear value function (passing through zero with slope 1) results in a neutral 1.0 
reservation price.  This merely captures the fact a risk-neutral individual would have a 
linear value or utility function, and would accept an actuarially fairly priced annuity 
because it is a fair gamble. 
 Two other patterns emerge from the behavioral models: loss aversion always 
makes annuities less attractive, and the distortion of probabilities into decision weights 
can result in longevity annuities becoming attractive gambles.  (The full CPT model 
implies that the reservation price surpasses one at age 93.)  A contributing factor is that 
the annual payouts associated with such long-delayed annuities are quite large relative to 
the initial investment.  For example, a longevity annuity beginning payouts at age 95 
would have an annual payout of approximately $10 per $1 investment at age 65.  In this 
sense, these annuities are somewhat like lottery tickets.  We observe here that CPT has 
been used to explain why individuals play lotteries with negative expected values, and 
our later analysis of the decisions weights will show how this applies to making longevity 
annuities attractive.  However, we again urge caution against interpreting these results too 
literally.  The reservation prices shown here are intended to provide qualitative 
explanations of the relative attractiveness of different types of annuities.  We do not 
believe that the Tversky and Kahneman CPT parameter values should be used to make 
                                                                                                                                                 
We use reservation price here because it provides a simple measure under the expected utility model that 
does not require assumptions about the specific form of the utility function. 
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precise predictions about, for example, whether a longevity annuity which starts payouts 
at age 90 will remain unattractive. 
 
Time Discounting 
 CPT was intended to explain choices over single-period gambles, whereas 
annuities have payouts occurring over multiple periods.  In our application of CPT to the 
annuity decision, we have assumed that future payouts were correctly discounted to a 
present value.  This would be a difficult computational task for most retirees to perform 
correctly, so we provide an additional set of calculations assuming no time discounting of 
the payouts (but maintaining the assumed interest rate of 3 percent which is used to price 
bonds and annuities).  For example, a 65-year old male retiree considering investing 
$100,000 in an immediate annuity would expect an annual payout of $7,560 under our 
interest rate and mortality assumptions.  If he were to evaluate the payouts by simply 
multiplying $7,560 by a life expectancy of 17 years, his “expected payout” would appear 
to be an attractive $129,000.  This is similar to the notion that many individuals suffer 
from “money illusion” by confounding real and nominal dollars (Shafir, Diamond, and 
Tversky [1997]).8   
 Because all annuity contracts involve a current investment in exchange for 
potential future payouts, a lower rate of time discount will raise the reservation price 
values.  Table 2 shows that this effect is strong enough to make all annuities attractive to 
an individual who shows all of the behavioral anomalies of CPT.  While we have not 
                                                 
8 We do not explicitly analyze issues related to the fact that most annuities have nominal payouts.  
However, our analysis can be interpreted as an evaluation of annuities priced with a 3% nominal interest 
rate, and discounted with either a 3% discount rate (no money illusion) or a 0% discount rate (money 
illusion).  Qualitatively, it should be clear that individuals suffering from money illusion should like 
annuities more than otherwise. 
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found compelling empirical evidence showing that this extreme form of mis-discounting 
is widespread, investment professionals are well familiar with the fact that people 
typically underestimate the power of compound interest.  This effect is more pronounced 
for longevity annuities, since all of the payouts may need to be discounted by multiple 
years.  (In contrast, immediate annuities have several payments that need to be 
discounted only by a few years.)  Thus, one might expect mis-discounting to make 
longevity annuities more attractive than immediate annuities.9 
 
The Distribution of Annuity Outcomes 
 Purchasing an immediate annuity entails a small probability of losing all of the 
initial investment (if death occurs immediately after signing the contract), while longevity 
annuities may have very large probabilities of not receiving any payouts.  On the positive 
side, an actuarially fairly priced immediate annuity holds approximately a 50% chance of 
earning back the initial investment.10  In contrast, under our pricing assumptions a 
longevity annuity beginning payouts at age 85 has only about a 30% chance of breaking 
even, but the potential subsequent gains are larger than for immediate annuities.  Table 3 
shows the cumulative distribution of outcomes for an immediate annuity and for an age 
85 longevity annuity.  The second-to-last column shows the cumulative decision weights 
associated with the outcomes at each age.  For example, at age 65, there is a 2 percent 
probability of dying in the next year, but the decision weight on that outcome is an 
                                                 
9 The large magnitude of longevity annuities’ payments is one feature that Milevsky [2005] argues should 
make these annuities more appealing than immediate annuities.  Put simply, payments that incorporate 
many years of accrued interest look quite large relative to the initial investment.  Of course, the annual 
payments for longevity annuities are also boosted by the fact that the payments are contingent on survival 
until those later ages. 
10 It is not an exact 50% probability, because the shape of the survival curve at all ages affects the annuity 
price and the chance of breaking even. 
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overstated 6 percent; this is the classic behavioral property of overweighting of small 
probabilities.  For an immediate annuity, this means that the worst event’s importance is 
overstated under CPT.  In contrast, observe that surviving through age 80 still results in a 
loss of 100 percent for a longevity annuity, but its true probability of 45 percent is 
slightly underweighted in a decision weight of only 42 percent.  Thus, one essential 
behavioral difference between immediate annuities and longevity annuities is the 
weighting attached to their worst outcomes.   
 Another difference becomes apparent by examining the magnitude of possible 
gains in Table 3.  For a person who buys an immediate annuity at age 65 and dies at age 
100, the immediate annuity results in approximately a 70 percent return on investment 
(i.e., the present discounted value of payouts is equal to 1.7 times the initial outlay).  
However, a similarly long-lived individual who had purchased a longevity annuity that 
starts payouts at age 85 would earn back a return of nearly 500 percent.  The difference 
reflects the fact that the annual income from a longevity annuity is many times the 
income from an immediate annuity purchased with the same initial outlay.  The last 
column in the table reports the cumulative decision weight attached to outcomes better 
than each column’s outcome: at age 100, the true one percent probability of outliving that 
age is overweighted to a six percent decision weight. (A similar pattern can be seen at 
ages 90 and 95.)  Thus, we see the second essential behavioral difference between 
immediate and longevity annuities: longevity annuities have much larger potential gains 
if the retiree lives a very long time, and this prospect is likely to be overweighted. 
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Explaining Annuity Contract Forms: Period Certain Annuities 
The preceding analysis has explained the relative unpopularity of immediate 
annuities: a behavioral investor will overweight the low probability of early death, which 
results in a near-complete loss of the initial investment, and loss aversion makes this 
outcome even more unpalatable.  Among annuities that are purchased, one of the most 
popular contract features is the guarantee of a minimum number of payouts, even if the 
annuity purchaser dies early.  These “life with period certain” annuities represent 73 
percent of all individual immediate life annuities sold in the U.S. (LIMRA 1998).  
From an economic point of view, a life with period certain annuity is identical to a 
combination of two different investments: a series of zero-coupon bonds for the 
guaranteed period, plus a longevity annuity commencing after the guarantee period.  The 
interesting question then becomes why do individuals wish to purchase a combination of 
bonds and an annuity from an insurance provider (often with substantial fees), rather than 
creating these bundles themselves?  Is there a financial alchemy that results from the 
combination of these two products that does not occur when they are separated?  
Extending the application of CPT to these annuities sheds light on this question. 
As before, we calculate the potential outcome of the annuity at different potential 
ages of death, for an annuity purchaser who is a 65-year old male.  For example, when 
considering a life annuity with 10 years of guaranteed payouts, all outcomes where death 
occurs within the first 10 years are identical.  We then apply the same CPT value function 
and decision weights as were used for the results in Table 1.  Table 4 shows the CPT 
reservation prices for various guarantee periods.  The first row reproduces the earlier 
results for an immediate annuity with no guaranteed payouts. 
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 Adding guaranteed payouts to the annuity contract makes the annuity more 
attractive.  An alternative method of viewing these results is that a fixed $100 investment 
in the annuity with more guaranteed payouts means a lower-risk investment overall.  For 
example, a life annuity with a 10-year guarantee period costing $100 (and yielding an 
annual payment of $7) is fundamentally comprised of a package of bonds worth $63 plus 
a longevity annuity costing $37.  The greater attractiveness of period certain annuities is 
due to the fact that the mental account now combines a riskless bond portfolio with a 
smaller risky annuity.  The bond component has a 100% reservation price (per dollar of 
bond investment), thus increasing the overall reservation price per dollar of the blended 
bond-plus-annuity investment.  This effect makes sense of why most annuity purchasers 
choose a guaranteed period.  Interpreted in a more intuitive sense, the guarantee period 
minimizes the anxiety associated with possible early death after the annuity investment is 
made.11  While longevity annuities are too new to have reliable data on their popularity, 
we conjecture that guarantee periods or similar features such as death benefits will be a 
common feature of these annuities when they are purchased.  This leads to the irony that 
one way to make longevity insurance more acceptable is to dilute the insurance with a 
bond investment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Many researchers have used variations of expected utility models to attempt to 
explain the “annuity puzzle” of why the vast majority of retirees do not voluntarily 
                                                 
11 In a more surreal sense, the guarantee period reduces the fear of “regretting” the annuity decision from 
the grave, should the purchaser die early.  It is possible that individuals have a “legacy motive” in which 
they consider whether their children will think poorly of a decision to annuitize should they die early.  This 
differs from a standard bequest motive in which the individual derives utility from the dollar value of a 
bequest. 
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annuitize any retirement savings.  Despite these efforts, a significant puzzle remains.  
This paper applies the lessons of behavioral decision research to the annuity decision in 
order to determine whether well-documented anomalies that individuals make in 
choosing between risky outcomes might explain low annuity demand.  We identified 
several factors that make annuities look undesirable, explained the popularity of 
guaranteed period life annuities, and made some predictions about the potential 
attractiveness of newly introduced longevity annuities. 
The most important potential reason for annuities being unpopular is mental 
accounting.  If annuity outcomes are segregated from their impact on total retirement 
spending, then purchasing an annuity appears to be a gamble which increases overall 
risk, rather than a form of insurance which can reduce risk.  In order to combat this 
problem, annuity marketers and financial advisors need to better frame the annuity as 
longevity insurance.  Having longevity insurance in the form of an annuity should reduce 
the need for precautionary saving and thus allow annuity holders to consume more in 
retirement.  Ironically, the recent growth of variable annuities, which provide a 
combination of investment return and longevity insurance, may have undermined the 
ability to frame annuities as longevity insurance rather than as investment products. 
Among those retirees who do annuitize some retirement savings, the popularity of 
annuities with guaranteed minimum payouts can be explained by the mental accounting 
framework.  Life with period certain annuities combine a riskless bond portfolio with a 
risky annuity contract, thus making the overall bundle less risky than a pure annuity 
contract.  Thus, our application of behavioral finance to annuities allows us to explain not 
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only the overall low demand for annuities, but also the types of annuity offerings seen in 
the marketplace. 
Within the context of cumulative prospect theory, loss aversion and the 
overweighting of small probabilities are each significant factors that make annuities look 
more undesirable than under expected utility.  Interestingly, the overweighting of small 
probabilities may make some longevity annuities look more attractive than immediate 
annuities.  Money illusion in the form of mistakes in time discounting may also 
contribute to the attractiveness of longevity annuities.  While exploiting behavioral 
anomalies would be an ignoble way to induce annuity demand, these distortions may 
induce some retirees to more thoroughly consider these longevity annuities, which have 
been shown to be more desirable than immediate annuities in a normative, expected 
utility context (Scott, Watson, and Hu [2006]).  Less easily quantifiable biases such as the 
availability heuristic or ambiguity aversion may alter annuity demand differently than our 
quantitative analysis suggests, however.  Ultimately, we hope that the behavioral biases 
working against annuities can be overcome through proper framing and analysis, so that 
more retirees might agree with the normative economic conclusion that annuitization of 
some part of retirement savings should be desirable in many cases.  
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Appendix - Other Behavioral Factors 
 Cumulative prospect theory allows us to rigorously combine all of the many 
possible outcomes and their probabilities into a single “value” (or utility) measure.  
However, we have so far ignored some other behavioral anomalies that are less 
straightforward to incorporate into the analysis.  In this section, we discuss in turn the 
availability heuristic, fear of illiquidity, hyperbolic discounting, and the behavioral 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
 
The Availability Heuristic 
 Separately from prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman [1974] delineated 
several ways in which individuals’ probability assessments are influenced by the use of 
simple heuristics.  One that is particularly relevant for annuity decisions may be the 
“availability heuristic”: events or facts that are more easily imagined (i.e., more available 
to the mind) carry greater salience and hence are assigned greater likelihood.  In the case 
of annuities, the availability heuristic may play a role in overemphasizing the possibility 
of dying shortly after the annuity is purchased, because there are many ways an 
individual can imagine his imminent demise.  The likelihood of greatly outliving one’s 
life expectancy may, on the other hand, not have as much salience, except in those cases 
where family members or other acquaintances have survived to very advanced ages.  This 
exaggeration of the likelihood of early death would make annuities appear worse than in 
the analysis of section 4.  (This overemphasis could also be another contributing factor to 
the popularity of guaranteed period annuities.)   
 A related anomaly is the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman 1983), 
which leads individuals to mistakenly believe that a combination of events is more likely 
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than either event alone.  In a classic experiment, individuals were presented with the 
following description of a hypothetical woman: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, 
and very bright.  She majored in philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned 
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.”  Most individuals believed that it was more likely that Linda was both a 
bank teller and active in the feminist movement than that she was a bank teller.  For an 
annuity purchaser, this anomaly in probability assessment can lead to an overstatement of 
the likelihood of early death, if the individual imagines death from car accidents, airplane 
crashes, heart disease, etc. as separate events.  In contrast, the prospect of living a very 
long time is more difficult to disassemble into several compound events which would be 
separately overweighted.  Thus, the conjunction fallacy combined with the availability 
heuristic can lead to a greater emphasis on the potential losses due to early death, without 
a similar overemphasis on the potential gains from outliving one’s life expectancy. 
 
Fear of Illiquidity 
 A significant feature of annuities is their illiquidity: once an investment is made, it 
is usually impossible to withdraw funds (beyond regularly scheduled payments) in case 
of unanticipated higher spending needs.  In a Society of Actuaries [2004] survey, among 
workers who were asked what factors were important in choosing a retirement plan 
payout option, sixty-one percent responded that “being able maintain control of your 
investments” was very important.  While potential liquidity needs is certainly a valid 
reason not to annuitize all retirement savings, it should not be a significant concern when 
evaluating whether to annuitize modest fractions of retirement wealth.  However, similar 
to the behavioral mistakes that individuals make when assessing probabilities of dying at 
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early ages, it is quite possible that individuals also overstate the likelihood of catastrophic 
events that may require sudden spending that could not be met after annuitization.  Such 
errors may be due to the availability heuristic (health shocks are relatively easy to 
imagine) and made worse by the conjunction fallacy (there are multiple types of health 
shocks that may be imagined and hence their joint likelihood overstated). 
 
Hyperbolic Discounting 
 A distinct branch of the literature has focused on anomalies related to time 
discounting.  One prominent model—hyperbolic discounting—posits that, viewed from 
period t, the discount rate between t and t+1 is higher than that between t+k and t+k+1 
(assuming k>0).  This description of decision-making has two interesting (and opposing) 
implications for annuity decisions.  First, any annuity evaluated narrowly as a gamble in 
its own mental account will look more unattractive, because an annuity shifts money 
from the present into the future.  Second, Laibson [1997] shows that hyperbolic 
discounters who are aware that their rate of impatience will evolve over time will benefit 
from self-commitment devices that prevent them from “overspending.”12  Christmas 
savings clubs and tax-advantaged defined contribution plans with early withdrawal 
penalties have been identified as potential commitment devices.  Annuities are another 
mechanism for committing to a retirement spending plan. 
 One might then ask why annuities are not as much demanded as some other 
savings-commitment devices.  We can point to two plausible explanations.  First, using 
an annuity as a commitment device requires the retiree to overcome the other behavioral 
                                                 
12 “Overspending” is defined as spending more at time t+k (relative to time t+k+1) than would have been 
desired when a consumption plan was made at time t. 
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anomalies analyzed in this paper, whereas choosing to save in a 401(k) plan is usually not 
thought of as risky.  Second, annuities compete against a popular heuristic—“don’t spend 
from principal”—that may serve as an adequate (though economically inefficient) 
commitment.13  This heuristic, another form of mental accounting, does not have the 
same legal force as an annuity contract, but casual observation suggests that it is powerful 
enough for retirees to follow.  Moreover, the argument that hyperbolic discounters will 
demand commitment devices requires that they be “sophisticated” enough to know that 
their preferences will change; this contrasts to the so-called “naïve” hyperbolic 
discounters who are unaware of their self-control issues.  It is conceivable that the “don’t 
spend from principal” rule is powerful and simple enough for the “sophisticated” 
hyperbolic discounter to choose this method of commitment over annuities. 
 
Risk v. Uncertainty 
 Ellsberg [1961] demonstrated that many individuals prefer to bet on a single ball 
drawn from an urn with 50 black and 50 red balls, rather than on a ball drawn from an urn 
with 100 balls of unknown composition of black and red balls.  In the behavioral 
literature, this has been called “ambiguity aversion”: individuals are more averse to 
“uncertain” gambles (unknown probabilities) than to “risky” gambles (known 
probabilities).  In Tversky and Kahneman’s calibration of the CPT model parameters and 
in our analysis in section 4, we assumed that survival probabilities were known.  This 
assumption places a high degree of confidence in the knowledge of most retirees.  It is 
straightforward to extend Ellsberg’s result to suggest qualitatively that retirees who are 
                                                 
13 Laibson [1997] notes that some consumers may use “internal self-control mechanisms, like ‘will-power’ 
and ‘personal rules.’” 
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uncertain about survival probabilities will be more averse to annuities than implied by 
our earlier results.  One can further conjecture that, in comparing immediate and 
longevity annuities, the degree of uncertainty may be more relevant for longevity 
annuities, since outcomes for longevity annuities depend more on events further into the 
future (i.e., many retirees may have a relatively accurate sense of the probability of living 
until age 75, but a worse idea of the likelihood of living until age 100).  Thus, the relative 
attractiveness of longevity annuities vis-à-vis immediate annuities may be worse than 
implied by the analysis in section 4. 
 An important countervailing factor is the fact that purchasing a longevity annuity 
can significantly reduce the uncertainty of the retiree’s planning horizon.  For example, a 
retiree who purchases an annuity to cover all anticipated expenses after age 85 can better 
focus the investment portfolio on providing spending from age 65 until 85.  This 
reduction in uncertainty would be ignored by an individual engaging strictly in mental 
accounting, but this is one major advantage of longevity annuities that we would think 
likely to be communicated in annuity marketing materials. 
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Figure 1 - CPT Probability Weighting Function
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Table 1 
Annuity Reservation Price per $1 for a 65-Year Old Male 
     
 Age of First Annuity Payout: 
  65 75 85 95 
Expected Utility 2.10 3.62 9.95 78.44 
     
Mental Accounting with Reference Point:     
  A. Linear Value Function (No Loss Aversion) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
     
  B. CPT Value Function     
          No Loss Aversion 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.70 
          With Loss Aversion 0.85 0.70 0.48 0.29 
     
  C. CPT including Decision Weights     
          No Loss Aversion 0.98 1.06 1.39 2.78 
          With Loss Aversion 0.77 0.68 0.74 1.20 
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Table 2 
No Time Discounting 
  
Age of First 
Annuity 
Payout 
Reservation 
Price per $1 
65 1.03 
75 1.16 
85 1.57 
95 3.24 
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Table 3 
Summary of Outcomes and Decision Weights for a 65-year old Male 
      
  Annuity Outcomes Decision Weights 
Age 
Probability 
of Dying by 
Each Age 
Immediate 
Annuity 
Age 85 
Longevity 
Annuity 
Cumulative 
Weight 
Weight on 
Better 
Outcomes  
65 0.02 -92% -100% 0.06 0.81 
70 0.13 -58% -100% 0.20 0.67 
75 0.27 -28% -100% 0.31 0.56 
80 0.45 -2% -100% 0.42 0.45 
85 0.64 20% -56% 0.52 0.35 
90 0.83 39% 147% 0.63 0.24 
95 0.95 56% 322% 0.73 0.14 
100 0.99 70% 472% 0.81 0.06 
      
Note: Sum of decision weights equals 0.87, not 1.   
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Table 4 
 Life with Period Certain Annuities 
   
Number of 
Guaranteed 
Years 
Annual 
Payout 
Reservation 
Price per $1 
 0 7.6 0.77 
 5 7.5 0.81 
10 7.1 0.88 
15 6.6 0.94 
20 6.0 0.98 
 
